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Joint Index Coding and Incentive Design for
Selfish Clients
Yu-Pin Hsu, I-Hong Hou, and Alex Sprintson
Abstract
The index coding problem includes a server, a group of clients, and a set of data chunks. While
each client wants a subset of the data chunks and already has another subset as its side information,
the server transmits some uncoded data chunks or coded data chunks to the clients over a noiseless
broadcast channel. The objective of the problem is to satisfy the demands of all clients with the minimum
number of transmissions. In this paper, we investigate the index coding setting from a game-theoretical
perspective. We consider selfish clients, where each selfish client has private side information and a
private value of each data chunk it wants. In this context, our objectives are following: 1) to motivate
each selfish client to reveal the correct side information and true value of each data chunk it wants; 2)
to maximize the social welfare, i.e., the total value of the data chunks recovered by the clients minus
the total cost incurred by the transmissions from the server. Our problem poses more challenges than
traditional incentive design problems because each selfish client in our problem can lie about more
than one type of information (i.e., its side information and the value of each data chunk it wants). Our
main contribution is to develop computationally efficient coding schemes and incentive schemes for
achieving the first objective perfectly and achieving the second objective optimally or approximately
(with guaranteed approximation ratios).
I. INTRODUCTION
The index coding problem is one of fundamental problems in wireless network coding. An
instance of the index coding problem includes a server, a set of wireless clients, and a set D
of data chunks. Each client wants a subset of data chunks in set D and has a different subset
of data chunks in set D given to it as side information. The server can transmit uncoded data
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Fig. 1. A server has a set D = {d1, d2, d3, d4} of data chunks. Client ci wants data chunk wi = di with its value vi, and has
set Hi ⊆ D as its side information.
chunks or coded data chunks (i.e., combinations of data chunks in set D) to all clients over
a noiseless broadcast channel. The goal of the problem is to identify a coding (transmission)
scheme requiring the minimum number of transmissions to satisfy the demands of all clients.
For example, Fig. 1 depicts an instance of the index coding problem, where a server needs to
deliver four data chunks in set D = {d1, · · · , d4} to all clients. The conventional communication
approach (without coding) transmits all four data chunks d1, · · · , d4. With the assist of coding,
broadcasting only three coded data chunks d1 + d2, d2 + d3, and d4 (over GF2)) can satisfy all
clients.
While transmitting an (uncoded or coded) data chuck can incur a significant transmission cost,
the server transmits a data chunk only when the data chunk is important enough to clients. Unlike
the original index coding problem (where the server has to satisfy all clients), we investigate an
interesting and practical scenario where server’s transmissions have to strike a balance between
the value of the data chunks and the cost of the transmissions. Instead of minimizing the number
of transmissions, our first goal is to identify a coding scheme for maximizing the social welfare,
i.e., the difference between the value of the data chunks that can be recovered by a client and
the cost incurred by the transmissions from the server. In our problem, the server transmits those
data chunks whose value can justify the transmission cost.
To calculate the social welfare, the server needs each client’s side information and each client’s
valuation of the data chunks it wants. However, each client is potentially selfish in the sense that
3it has private side information and a private value of each data chunk it wants. In particular,
we cannot expect a selfish client to reveal the correct side information or the true value of each
data chunk it wants. Thus, our second goal is to develop an incentive scheme for providing each
client with an incentive to reveal the true information.
A. Contributions
We investigate the index coding setting in the presence of selfish clients, aiming to propose a
joint coding and incentive design (called a mechanism) for 1) motivating each selfish client to
truthfully reveal its side information and the value of each data chunk it wants and 2) maximizing
the social welfare. Our first main contribution is to provide a sufficient condition for mechanisms
that can motivate each selfish client to be truthful. Our second main contribution is to develop
computationally efficient mechanisms. With the proposed sufficient condition, we establish their
truthfulness. Moreover, we analyze their optimality or their worst-case approximation ratios in
terms of the social welfare. We also conduct extensive computer simulations to examine the
proposed mechanisms in average-case scenarios.
B. Related works
The index coding problem was introduced in [2] and has become a hot topic. Most related
works characterized capacity regions (e.g., [3]) for various network settings or developed com-
putationally efficient coding schemes to (optimally or approximately) achieve the regions (e.g.,
[4]). In addition to the original index coding problem, some variants of the index coding problem
have also been investigated, such as the pliable index coding problem (e.g., [5]) and the secure
index coding problem (e.g., [6]). See [7] for extensive surveys. All the prior works on the index
coding neglected potentially selfish clients. Thus, our work introduces another variant of the
index coding problem by considering selfish clients.
Many prior works on network coding considered selfish clients. Most of those works (e.g., [8–
12]) analyzed equilibrium in the presence of selfish clients. Few works (e.g., [13, 14]) developed
incentive schemes for network-coding-enabled networks. In particular, those works focused on
incentive design for fixed coding schemes. For example, [13] and [14] used random linear codes.
In contrast, our work considers a joint coding and incentive design problem.
4Our problem is also related to auction design [15] for motivating an auction participant to
reveal the true value of each item. However, our problem is fundamentally different from the
traditional auction design as follows.
• In the traditional auction, an item is given to the winner only. However, in our problem, a
transmission from the server can be received by all clients, and a client can decode some
data chunks by its side information.
• In the traditional auction, an auction participant can only lie about the value of each item.
However, in our problem, a client can lie about not only the value of each data chunk it
wants but also the side information it has. The multi-dimensional private information poses
more challenges than the traditional incentive design (as also claimed in [16]).
This paper considers a new and practical problem, which lies in the intersection of coding theory
and game theory. We are discovering a new and challenging problem.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Network model
We consider a wireless broadcast network consisting of a server and a set c1, · · · , cn of n
wireless clients. The server has a set D = {d1, · · · , dm} of m data chunks, where each data
chunk di represents an element of the Galois field GF (q) of order q. The server can transmit
uncoded data chunks or coded data chunks (combined from data chunks in set D) to all clients
over a noiseless broadcast channel. Without loss of generality, each client ci wants a single data
chunk wi in set D and already has a subset Hi of data chunks in set D as side information. A
client that wants more than one data chunk can be substituted by multiple clients with the same
side information.
B. Coding schemes
In this paper, we consider scalar-linear coding schemes. In those schemes, every transmission
made by the server is a linear combination of the data chunks in set D. Precisely, the i-th
transmission ti made by the server can be expressed by ti =
∑m
j=1 gi,jdj with coding coefficient
gi,j ∈ GF (q), for all i = 1, · · · , η, where η represents the total number of transmissions made
by the server. Let Gi = (gi,1, · · · , gi,m) be the coding vector of ti. Moreover, let G = [Gi]ηi=1 be
the coding matrix whose i-th rows is the coding vector of ti.
5After receiving the transmissions t1, · · · , tη from the server, client ci can recover data chunk
wi it wants if and only if wi can be expressed as a linear combination of t1, · · · , tη and its side
information Hi. Note that the server does not need to satisfy all clients in our setting. Let 1i
indicate if coding matrix G can recover data chunk wi with side information Hi, where 1i = 1
if it can; 1i = 0 if it cannot.
Each client ci has a value vi representing the importance of data chunk wi to it. Suppose that
each transmission (from the server) incurs a transmission cost of one unit. The transmission cost
can reflect, for example, the power consumption. To capture the tradeoff between the importance
of the data chunks and the power consumption, we define a social welfare by
n∑
i=1
vi · 1i − η, (1)
where the first term vi · 1i expresses the value of data chunk wi that can be recovered by client
ci and the second term η expresses the cost of the total η transmissions made by the server. For
example, the social welfare of transmitting d1 + d2, d2 + d3, and d4 (the solution to the index
coding problem) in Fig. 1 is 0.2 + 0.9+ 0.5+ 0.6− 3 = −0.8. In contrast, the social welfare of
transmitting d3 + d4 is 0.5 + 0.6 − 1 = 0.1 (where only clients c3 and c4 can recover the data
chucks they want). Thus, transmitting d3+d4 is more valuable than transmitting d1+d2, d2+d3,
and d4 from the global view. In this paper, we aim to develop a coding scheme for maximizing
the social welfare.
C. Incentive schemes
To maximize the social welfare, the server needs value vi and side information Hi from each
client ci. Thus, we consider a protocol with the following procedure:
1) The server broadcasts a hash function (with the input being an element of GF (q)) to
inquire about the side information of all clients.
2) Each client ci responds the hash outcomes produced by the data chunks in a set Hˆi ⊆ Hi
and by a set of random inputs denoted by H˜i 6⊆ Hi; moreover, it also submits a value vˆi
of data chuck wi it wants.
With those hash outcomes, the server can obtain side information Hˆi and H˜i responded by each
client ci. While client ci has no knowledge about the data chucks in set D − Hi, the random
6input set H˜i is unlikely to produce a hash outcome corresponding to a data chuck in set D−Hi.
Thus, we can assume that the server can identify H˜i (because of H˜i 6⊆ D) and remove it from
the side information responded by client ci. In the rest of the paper, we neglect the information
H˜i. Moreover, suppose that each client can lie about the value of the data chunk it wants or
the side information it has, so that the information vˆi and Hˆi (obtained by the server) can be
different from the true information vi and Hi (owned by client ci). Thus, in this paper, we also
aim to develop an incentive scheme for motivating each selfish client ci to reveal the correct
value vi and the complete side information Hi, so that vˆi = vi and Hˆi = Hi for all i. Let
Vˆ = {vˆ1, · · · , vˆn} and Hˆ = {Hˆ1, · · · , Hˆn} be the sets of all corresponding elements. Moreover,
let Vˆ−i = Vˆ − {vˆi} and Hˆ−i = Hˆ − {Hˆi} be the set of all corresponding elements except the
one for client ci.
In this paper, we consider money transfers between the server and clients as an incentive. Each
client ci has to pay the server for data chunk wi if the client can recover it. In this context, value
vi of data chunk wi implies the maximum amount of money client ci is willing to pay to obtain
it. Let pi be the payment of client ci charged by the server. A scheme determining payment pi
for each client ci is referred to as a payment scheme. In general, a payment scheme depends
on value set Vˆ, side information set Hˆ, and coding matrix G (which determines indicator 1i
for each client ci). The design of payment schemes and that of coding schemes depend on each
other. Thus, we define a mechanism by a joint coding and payment scheme. Suppose that the
mechanism is given to all clients.
For a given mechanism, we define a utility ui(Vˆ, Hˆ) for client ci by ui(Vˆ, Hˆ) = vi · 1i − pi,
which is the difference between the value of the data chunk it can recover and the money
charged by the server. Each client is selfish in the sense that, given the mechanism employed
by the server, it submits information vˆi and Hˆi for maximizing its utility ui(Vˆ, Hˆ).
In this paper, we aim to develop a mechanism such that
ui
({vi, Vˆ−i}, {Hi, Hˆ−i}) ≥ ui(Vˆ, Hˆ), (2)
for all Vˆ, Hˆ and i, where value set {vi, Vˆ−i} is value set Vˆ with vˆi being substituted by vi and
side information set {Hi, Hˆ−i} is side information set Hˆ with Hˆi being substituted by Hi. The
idea underlying Eq. (2) is that, regardless of the information Vˆ−i and Hˆ−i submitted by other
7clients, client ci can maximize its utility ui(Vˆ, Hˆ) by submitting its true information vi and Hi.
D. Problem formulation
A mechanism satisfying Eq. (2) is referred to as a truthful mechanism. Moreover, a truthful
mechanism that can also maximize the social welfare in Eq. (1) is refereed to as an optimal
truthful mechanism. We aim to develop an optimal truthful mechanism such that the social
welfare and the utilities of all clients are simultaneously optimized. Our problem involves both
the global and local optimization problems.
Note that local utility ui(Vˆ, Hˆ) involves more than one type of private information (i.e., value
and side information). The traditional incentive design for a single type of private information
might be insufficient to motivate a client in our problem to reveal the true information of both
types. Thus, Section III characterizes truthful mechanisms for our problem. With the results in
Section III, we will develop optimal or approximate truthful mechanisms for various scenarios
of our problem.
III. CHARACTERIZING TRUTHFUL MECHANISMS
This section provides a sufficient condition of truthful mechanisms for our problem. To that
end, we introduce a type of coding schemes as follows.
Definition 1. A coding scheme is a threshold-type coding scheme if, for every value set Vˆ−i
and side information set Hˆ, there exists a threshold v¯i(Vˆ−i, Hˆ) such that 1i = 1 when vˆi >
v¯i(Vˆ−i, Hˆ) and 1i = 0 when vˆi < v¯i(Vˆ−i, Hˆ), for all i.
Note that threshold v¯i(Vˆ−i, Hˆ) for client ci is independent of value vˆi submitted by client
ci, but is dependent on side information Hˆi revealed by client ci. The next theorem provides a
sufficient condition of truthful mechanisms for our problem.
Theorem 2. A mechanism is truthful if the following three conditions hold:
1) the coding scheme is a threshold-type coding scheme;
2) the payment scheme determines payment pi = v¯i(Vˆ−i, Hˆ) (for client ci) if 1i = 1, or
pi = 0 if 1i = 0;
3) v¯i(V−i, {Hi, Hˆ−i}) ≤ v¯i(V−i, Hˆ) for all Hˆ.
8Proof: See Appendix A.
The first two conditions in the above theorem claim that a client cannot affect the payment
by lying about the value of the data chunk it wants, because its payment depends on the values
submitted by other clients. The third condition claims that a client can minimize its payment
when revealing its complete side information. The theorem will be used later to establish the
truthfulness of the proposed mechanisms. We remark that the theorem generalizes the sufficient
condition in [15, Theorem 9.36] (which focused on the case when an auction participant has a
single type of private information).
IV. VCG-BASED MECHANISM DESIGN
This section proposes an optimal truthful mechanism leveraging the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) approach [15]. Note that the original VCG mechanism provides an auction
participant with an incentive to reveal only the true value of each item. However, our Theorem 4
will show that the proposed VCG-based mechanism can motivate each selfish client to reveal
not only the true value of the data chunk it wants but also its complete side information.
Our VCG-based mechanism uses the following function
w(Vˆ, Hˆ, G) =
n∑
i=1
vˆi · 1ˆi − η, (3)
where 1ˆi indicates if coding matrix G can recover data chunk wi with side information Hˆi:
1ˆi = 1 if it can, but 1ˆi = 1 otherwise. The function w(Vˆ, Hˆ, G) is the social welfare in Eq. (1)
computed by the information Vˆ and Hˆ obtained by the server. Then, we propose our VCG-
based mechanism as follows, including a VCG-based coding scheme and a VCG-based payment
scheme.
VCG-based coding scheme: For given value set Vˆ and side information set Hˆ, identify a
coding matrix G∗ for maximizing function w(Vˆ, Hˆ, G):
G∗ = argmax
G
w(Vˆ, Hˆ, G). (4)
Remark 3. We require the VCG-based coding scheme to meet a condition without loss of
optimality to Eq. (4). If 1ˆi = 0 under coding matrix G
∗ computed by Eq. (4), then coding vector
Gi of coding matrix G
∗ must be the zero vector. Setting those zero coding vectors for those data
9chunks that cannot be recovered does not change the maximum function value w(Vˆ, Hˆ, G∗).
The requirement is to prevent client ci from recovering data chuck wi with side information
Hi− Hˆi (that is unknown to the server) if 1ˆi = 0. If multiple coding matrices that are solutions
to Eq. (4) and satisfy the requirement, then we can arbitrarily choose one.
VCG-based payment scheme: If 1ˆi = 1 under coding matrix G
∗ computed by Eq. (4), then
charge client ci
pi = max
G
w({0, Vˆ−i}, Hˆ, G)− w({0, Vˆ−i}, Hˆ, G∗), (5)
where value set {0, Vˆ−i} is value set Vˆ with value vi being substituted by zero. Note that payment
pi is non-negative for all i. The idea underlying Eq. (5) is to calculate threshold v¯i(Vˆ−i, Hˆ) (see
Theorem 2) as payment pi for client ci. By setting vˆi = 0, the first term of Eq. (5) calculates
the maximum function value among all possible coding matrices G that cannot recover data
chunk wi. By setting vˆi = 0 and G = G
∗, the second term of Eq. (5) calculates the maximum
function value among all possible coding matrices G that can recover data chunk wi, when client
ci submits vˆi = 0. Thus, if client ci submits a value vˆi greater than that difference, then it can
recover data chunk wi.
The next theorem establishes the truthfulness and the optimality of the proposed VCG-based
mechanism.
Theorem 4. The VCG-based mechanism is an optimal truthful mechanism.
Proof: Appendix B confirms that the VCG-based mechanism is truthful (by Theorem 2).
Then, all clients submit the true values of the data chunks they want and their complete side
information. Moreover, by Eq. (4), the VCG-coding scheme maximizes the social welfare. Thus,
the VCG-based mechanism is an optimal truthful mechanism.
V. ALGORITHMIC HARDNESS RESULTS
Note that the proposed VCG-based mechanism involves the combinatorial problems in both
Eqs. (4) and (5). The next proposition shows that the combinatorial problems are NP-hard.
Proposition 5. The combinatorial optimization problems in Eqs. (4) and (5) are NP-hard.
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Proof: We construct a reduction from the original index coding problem. See Appendix C
for details.
To develop computationally efficient mechanisms, the rest of this paper considers sparse coding
schemes defined as follows.
Definition 6. A coding scheme is a sparse coding scheme if each transmission from the server
is a linear combination of at most two data chunks in set D (over GF (2)).
With sparse coding schemes, both encoders and decoders can be easily implemented, bringing
significant advantages for practical applications.
This paper considers two different scenarios: the multiple unicast scenario and the multiple
multicast scenario. While in the multiple unicast scenario each client wants a different data chunk,
in the multiple multicast scenario many clients can request the same data chunk. Moreover, we
define a special decoding scheme called the instant decoding scheme, which can combine each
individual transmission (from the server) with side information but cannot combine multiple
transmissions. For example, in Fig. 1, client c2 can instantly decode data chunk d2 by d1 + d2.
On the contrary, client c1 cannot instantly decode data chunk d1 by d1+d2 or d2+d3 separately
(but it can decode d1 by combining both d1 + d2 and d2 + d3). The instant decoding scheme
has a significant advantage in practical applications because a client only needs to receive one
transmission to recover the data chunk it wants; in particular, the client does not need to wait for
the whole η transmissions before recovering data chunk wi, resulting in a low decoding delay. In
contrast, a decoding scheme that can combine more than one transmission with side information
is referred to as a general decoding scheme.
Section VI develops computationally efficient mechanisms for the multiple unicast scenario.
While Section VI-A proposes an algorithm optimally solving Eqs. (4) and (5) in polynomial
time for the instant decoding scheme, Section VI-B establishes that the combinatorial problems
in Eqs. (4) and (5) are still NP-hard for the general decoding scheme. To cope with the NP-
hardness, Sections VI-B and VI-C develop two approximate truthful mechanisms. Subsequently,
Section VII shows that the combinatorial problems in Eq. (4) for the multiple multicast scenario
is not only NP-hard but also NP-hard to approximate. Table I summarizes our main results.
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TABLE I
ALGORITHMIC HARDNESS FOR SPARE CODING SCHEMES
Instant decoding scheme General decoding scheme
Multiple
unicast
scenario
Polynomial-time algorithm (Alg. 1)
for solving Eqs. (4) and (5)
Approximate truthful mechanisms:
• max |C|-approximate truthful mecha-
nism (Algs. 2 and 3)
• √n-approximate truthful mechanism
Multiple
multicast
scenario
NP-Hard to approximate Eq. (4) (Theorems 15 and 16)
VI. MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE MULTIPLE UNICAST SCENARIO
This section develops computationally efficient truthful mechanisms (with spare coding schemes)
for the multiple unicast scenario by proposing polynomial-time algorithms for (optimally or
approximately) solving Eq. (4). We remark an approximate solution to Eqs. (4) and (5) is
no longer a truthful mechanism (see Example 10 later). Thus, we devise alternative payment
schemes to substitute the previously proposed VCG-based payment scheme for guaranteeing the
truthfulness (see Sections VI-B and VI-C later).
To solve Eq. (4), we introduce a weighted dependency graph constructed as follows: given
value set Vˆ and side information set Hˆ,
• for each client ci, construct a vertex λi;
• for any two clients ci and cj such that wi ∈ Hˆj , construct a directed arc (λi, λj);
• associate each arc (λi, λj) with an arc weight γ(λi,λj) = vˆi.
The weighted dependency graph generalizes the dependency graph in [2] to a weighted version.
We denote the weighted dependency graph by G(Λ,A,Γ), where Λ is the vertex set, A is the
arc set, and Γ is the arc weight set. Fig. 2 illustrates the weighted dependency graph for the
instance in Fig. 1.
We make two observations about weighted dependency graphs:
• for the general decoding scheme, the server can satisfy all clients in a cycle C in graph
G(Λ,A,Γ) with |C| − 1 transmissions;
• for the instant decoding scheme, the server can satisfy all clients in a cycle C with |C| = 2
in graph G(Λ,A,Γ) with |C| − 1 = 1 transmissions.
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Fig. 2. Weighted dependency graph for the instance in Fig. 1 when vˆ1 = 0.8, vˆ2 = 0.9, vˆ3 = 0.5, vˆ4 = 0.6, and Hˆi = Hi
for all i.
For example, with the general decoding scheme, clients c1, c2, and c3 in cycle (λ1, λ2, λ3) of
Fig. 2 can recover the data chunks they want with d1 + d2 and d2 + d3. In contrast, with the
instant decoding scheme, clients c1, c2, and c3 cannot recover the data chunks they want with
any two transmissions among d1 + d2, d2 + d3, or d3 + d1. However, clients c3 and c4 in cycle
(λ3, λ4) of Fig. 2 can instantly decode the data chunks they want with d3 + d4.
We say that a coding scheme transmits along cycle C in weighted dependency graph G(Λ,A,Γ)
if it constructs |C| − 1 transmissions (by pair-wise coded data chunks) for satisfying all clients
in the cycle. Note that, for the instant decoding scheme, a coding scheme can transmit along
cycle C with |C| = 2 only, according to the above observations. While transmitting along a set
of (vertex) disjoint cycles can satisfy all clients in those cycles with fewer transmissions than
the number of the satisfied clients, all other sparse codes with no cycle being involved cannot
(see [17] for details). Those transmissions with no cycle being involved can be substituted by
uncoded data chunks without changing the function value in Eq. (3). Thus, we can focus on
spare coding schemes that transmits along disjoint cycles and additionally transmits uncoded
data chucks wi if vertex λi is not in those cycles (i.e., client ci cannot recover data chuck wi
with the transmissions along the cycles) but vˆi ≥ 1.
We aim to identify a coding matrix G including the coding vectors of transmitting along a set
C of disjoint cycles and those of uncoded data chuck wi if λi in not in those cycles but vˆi ≥ 1,
for maximizing
w(Vˆ, Hˆ, G) =
∑
C∈C
(∑
λi∈C
vˆi − (|C| − 1)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a)
+
∑
λi /∈C,∀C∈C
vˆi≥1
(vˆi − 1)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(b)
, (6)
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where (a) is because transmitting along cycle C satisfies all clients in the cycle with |C| − 1
transmissions; (b) considers uncoded data chucks for those clients that submits values of no less
than one but cannot recover the date chucks they want with the transmissions along the cycles.
Then, we use the notation [x]+1 = max{x, 1} to represent the truncation of x toward one; in
particular, we can re-write Eq. (6) in terms of truncated values as follow:
w(Vˆ, Hˆ, G) =
∑
C∈C
(∑
λi∈C
[vˆi]
+
1 − (|C| − 1)
)
+
∑
λi /∈C,∀C∈C
vˆi≥1
([vˆi]
+
1 − 1) +
∑
vˆi≥1
(vˆi − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a)
, (7)
where (a) adds back the deducted value (caused by the truncation). Because the value of the term∑
λi /∈C,∀C∈C
vˆi≥1
([vˆi]
+
1 − 1) is zero and the value of the term
∑
vˆi≥1
(vˆi− 1) in Eq. (7) is constant, it
suffices to maximize
∑
C∈C(
∑
λi∈C
[vˆi]
+
1 − (|C| − 1)).
To that end, we associate each cycle C in weighted dependency graph G(Λ,A,Γ) with a
cycle weight γ(C) defined by
γ(C) =
∑
a∈C
[γa]
+
1 − (|C| − 1), (8)
which implies the difference between the total truncated value submitted by the clients in cycle
C and the cost of transmitting along cycle C. Note that, for the instant decoding scheme, we
assign cycle weight γ(C) to cycles C with |C| = 2 only. Then, we can turn our attention to a
maximum weight cycle packing problem: identifying a set C of disjoint cycles for maximizing
the total cycle weight
∑
C∈C γ(C) in graph G(Λ,A,Γ).
Section VI-A optimally solves our maximum weight cycle packing problem for the instant
decoding scheme. For the general decoding scheme, Sections VI-B and VI-C propose two
approximate solutions to our maximum weight cycle packing problem and their respective
payment schemes as the incentives.
A. The instant decoding scheme
This section develops Alg. 1 for optimally solving Eqs. (4) and (5) when all clients use the
instant decoding scheme. Given value set Vˆ and side information set Hˆ, Alg. 1 aims to construct
a (sparse) coding matrix G for maximizing function w(Vˆ, Hˆ, G) in Eq. (7) in polynomial time.
To that end, Alg. 1 constructs weighted dependency graph G(Λ,A,Γ) in Line 2, aiming
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Algorithm 1: Polynomial-time algorithm for solving Eqs. (4) and (5).
input : Value set Vˆ and side information set Hˆ.
output: Coding matrix G∗ for maximizing function w(Vˆ, Hˆ, G).
1 G∗ ← ∅;
2 Construct weighted dependency graph G(Λ,A,Γ);
3 Construct undirected auxiliary graph G(Λ˜, E˜, Γ˜);
4 Find a maximum weight matching M∗ in G(Λ˜, E˜, Γ˜);
5 For each edge (λ˜i, λ˜j) ∈ M∗, add the coding vector of wi + wj to coding matrix G∗;
6 For each vertex λi /∈M∗ but vˆi ≥ 1, add the coding vector of data chunk wi to coding
matrix G∗;
to identify a set C of disjoint cycles C with |C| = 2 for maximizing total cycle weight∑
C∈C γ(C) in set C. To identify such a set of disjoint cycles, Alg. 1 constructs an undirected
graph G(Λ˜, E˜, Λ˜) in Line 3 with the following procedure:
• for each vertex λ ∈ Λ, construct a vertex λ˜ ∈ Λ˜;
• for any two vertices λi, λj ∈ Λ such that both arcs (λi, λj) and (λj, λi) are in set A,
construct an edge (λ˜i, λ˜j) ∈ E˜;
• associate each edge (λ˜i, λ˜j) ∈ E˜ with an edge weight γ˜ ∈ Γ˜ such that γ˜(λ˜i,λ˜j) = [γ(λi,λj)]+1 +
[γ(λj ,λi)]
+
1 − 1.
With the construction, each cycle C with |C| = 2 in graph G(Λ,A,Γ) corresponds to an edge
in graph G(Λ˜, E˜, Γ˜); in particular, a set of disjoint cycles in graph G(Λ,A,Γ) corresponds to
a matching in graph G(Λ˜, E˜, Γ˜). Moreover, a cycle weight in graph G(Λ,A,Γ) corresponds
to the edge weight in graph G(Λ˜, E˜, Γ˜). Thus, a set of disjoint cycles in graph G(Λ,A,Γ)
for maximizing the total cycle weight corresponds to a maximum weight matching in graph
G(Λ˜, E˜, Γ˜). Alg. 1 identifies a maximum weight matching in graph G(Λ,A,Γ) in Line 4 (by
some polynomial-time algorithms like the Edmonds’s algorithm [18]). Subsequently, Alg. 1
adds the coding vectors of the transmissions (along those cycles corresponding to the maximum
weight matching) to coding matrix G∗ in Line 5. Finally, if client ci submitting value vˆi ≥ 1 is
not satisfied by the coding matrix constructed by the maximum weight matching, then Alg. 1
adds the coding vector of data chunk wi to coding matrix G
∗ in Line 6. The discussion in this
paragraph leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 7. In the multiple unicast scenario, Alg. 1 can optimally solve the combinatorial
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Algorithm 2: max |C|-approximate coding scheme for the multiple unicast scenario.
input : Value set Vˆ and side information set Hˆ.
output: Coding matrix G.
1 G← ∅;
2 Construct weighted dependency graph G(Λ,A,Γ);
3 Associate each arc a ∈ A with arc cost ζa = 1− [γa]+1 ;
4 while there is a cycle in the present graph G(Λ,A,Γ) whose cycle cost is less than or
equal to one do
5 Find a cycle C in the present graph G(Λ,A,Γ) for minimizing cycle cost ζ(C);
6 Add the coding vectors of the |C| − 1 transmissions along along cycle C to coding
matrix G;
7 Remove all vertices in cycle C and their incident arcs from the present graph
G(Λ,A,Γ);
8 end
9 for i← 1 to n do
10 if λi is not in the selected cycles but vˆi ≥ 1 then
11 Add the coding vector of data chunk wi to coding matrix G;
12 end
13 end
optimization problems in Eqs. (4) and (5) in polynomial time when all clients use the instant
decoding scheme.
B. General decoding scheme: max |C|-approximate truthful mechanism
The next lemma shows that, for the general decoding scheme, the combinatorial optimization
problems in Eqs. (4) and (5) are still NP-hard.
Lemma 8. In the multiple unicast scenario, the combinatorial optimization problems in Eqs. (4)
and (5) are NP-hard when clients use the general decoding scheme.
Proof: We construct a reduction from the cycle packing problem [19]. See Appendix D for
details.
Thus, this section and next section develop two algorithms (Alg. 2 and its further modification)
for approximately solving Eq. (4). To that end, Alg. 2 constructs weighted dependency graph
G(Λ,A,Γ) in Line 2, aiming to approximately solving our maximum weight cycle packing
problem.
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The idea underlying Alg. 2 is to iteratively identify a maximum weight cycle in a greedy way.
Note that, in general, identifying a maximum weight cycle in a graph is NP-hard [20]. However,
for our problem, we can observe that cycle weight γ(C) of cycle C in Eq. (8) can be written as
γ(C) = 1−
∑
a∈C
(1− [γa]+1 ). (9)
By associating each arc a ∈ A with an arc cost ζa = 1− [γa]+1 , we can associate each cycle C
with a cycle cost ζ(C) =
∑
a∈C ζa, which is the total arc cost in cycle C. Then, cycle weight
γ(C) in Eq. (9) becomes γ(C) = 1 − ζ(C). Removing the constant, a maximum weight cycle
C minimizes cycle cost ζ(C). Thus, Alg. 2 identifies a minimum cost cycle in Line 5 (by some
polynomial-time algorithms like the Floyd-Warshall algorithm [21]), followed by adding the
coding vectors of the transmissions along the cycle to coding matrix G in Line 6. Subsequently,
Alg. 2 removes the cycle from the present graph in Line 7. The condition in Line 4 guarantees
that the maximum weight cycle in the present graph has a non-negative weight. Finally, if client
ci submitting value vˆi ≥ 1 is not in those selected cycles, then Alg. 2 adds the coding vector of
data chunk wi to G in Line 11.
Let Galg 2 be the coding matrix produced by Alg. 2 and let G
∗ be a (sparse) coding matrix
maximizing function w(Vˆ, Hˆ, G). The next theorem analyzes the approximation ratio w(Vˆ,Hˆ,G
∗)
w(Vˆ,Hˆ,Galg 2)
of Alg. 2.
Theorem 9. The approximation ratio of Alg. 2 is the maximum cycle length in weighted depen-
dency graph G(Λ,A,Γ).
Proof: See Appendix E.
Because of Theorem 9, we refer to Alg. 2 as max |C|-approximate coding scheme. Next, we
show that applying max |C|-approximate coding scheme to solve Eqs. (4) and (5) is no longer
a truthful mechanism.
Example 10. Look at Fig. 3. First, suppose that all clients submit the true values of the data
chunks they want. Then, Alg. 2 produces d2 + d3 along cycle (λ2, λ3) in Fig. 3(b). In this case,
client c1 has the zero utility. Second, suppose that client c1 submits vˆ1 = 0.7 but other clients
submit the true values of the data chunks they want. Then, Alg. 2 produces d1 + d2 and d3 + d4
along cycles (λ1, λ2) and (λ3, λ4), respectively. By solving Eq. (5) with Alg. 2, client c1 is
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Fig. 3. (a) Counter-example of the truthfulness property when we use Alg. 2 to solve Eqs. (4) and (5); (b) The weighted
dependency graph.
charged p1 = (0.6 + 0.6 − 1)− (0.6 + 0.6 + 0.55− 2) = 0.45. In this case, client c1 has utility
0.55 − 0.45 = 0.1. Thus, the condition for a truthful mechanism in Eq. (2) fails. Client c1 can
obtain a higher utility by lying about the value of data chunk wi.
To address the issue in the above example, we propose a payment scheme in Alg. 3 so that
the joint design of Algs. 2 and 3 is a truthful mechanism. The underlying idea of Alg. 3 is to
calculate threshold v¯i(Vˆ−i, Hˆ) for each client ci (that can recover data chunk wi by Alg. 2) as
payment pi. To that end, Alg. 3 constructs weighted dependency graph G(Λ,A,Γ) in Line 1;
moreover, Alg. 3 associates each arc a ∈ A with an arc cost ζa in Line 2. Note that Alg. 3
defines the arc costs in a different way from Alg. 2; precisely, Alg. 3 associates each outgoing
arc from vertex λi with the cost of one unit (i.e., assuming value vˆi = 0). Then, Alg. 3 calculates
the difference of the cycle costs between cycle C1 (in Line 5) and cycle C2 (in Line 6), where
cycle C1 has the globally maximum weight but cycle C2 has the locally maximum weight among
those cycles containing vertex λi. While the value of 1 − ζ(C1) (see Eq. (9)) is analogous to
the first term of Eq. (5), that of 1− ζ(C2) is analogous to the second term of Eq. (5). Thus, the
difference ζ(C2)− ζ(C1) of the cycle costs in Line 7 for each iteration is the minimum value vˆi
submitted by client ci such that a cycle containing vertex λi can be selected by Line 5 of Alg. 2
in that iteration. Then, Alg. 3 identifies threshold v¯i(Vˆ−i, Hˆ) by searching for the minimum
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Algorithm 3: Payment scheme for those clients that can recover the data chunks they want
by Alg. 2.
input : Value set Vˆ, side information set Hˆ, and client ci that can recover data chunk wi
by Alg. 2.
output: Payment pi for client ci.
1 Construct weighted dependency graph G(Λ,A,Γ);
2 Associate each arc a ∈ A with arc cost ζa:
ζa =
{
1 if a = (λi, λj) for some j;
1− [γa]+1 if a 6= (λi, λj) for all j.
3 pi ← 1;
4 while there exists a cycle in the present graph G(Λ,A,Γ) whose cost is less than or equal
to one, and there exists a cycle containing vertex λi do
5 Find a cycle C1 = argminC ζ(C) in the present graph G(Λ,A,Γ) for minimizing the
cycle cost;
6 Find a cycle C2 = argminC∩λi 6=∅ ζ(C) in the present graph G(Λ,A,Γ) that contains
vertex λi and minimizes the cycle cost ζ(C) among those cycles containing vertex λi;
7 pi ← min{pi, ζ(C2)− ζ(C1)};
8 Remove all vertices in cycle C1 and their incident arcs from the present graph
G(Λ,A,Γ);
9 end
among all iterations in Line 7 along with the initial value of pi being 1 as in Line 3 (because
each client ci can recover the data chuck it wants when submitting vˆi ≥ 1).
By verifying the three conditions in Theorem 2, the next theorem shows that the joint Algs. 2
and 3 is a truthful mechanism.
Theorem 11. The mechanism consisting of the coding scheme in Alg. 2 and the payment scheme
in Alg. 3 is a truthful mechanism.
Proof: See Appendix F.
C.
√
n-approximate truthful mechanism
This section proposes another approximate coding scheme and its corresponding payment
scheme for guaranteeing the truthfulness. The approximate coding scheme modifies the previ-
ously proposed Alg. 2. The modified approximate coding scheme substitutes Line 5 of Alg. 2 (i.e.,
identifying a cycle for maximizing cycle weight γ(C)) by identifying a cycle C for maximizing
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Algorithm 4: Identifying cycle C for maximizing γ(C)√
|C|
.
input : Weight dependency graph G(Λ,A,Γ).
output: Cycle C maximizing γ(C)√
|C|
.
1 C ← ∅;
2 for i← 2 to n do
3 Find a cycle C ′ = argminC′′ ζ(C
′′) subject to |C ′′| ≤ i;
4 C ← argmaxC′ orC{ γ(C′)√
|C′|
, γ(C)√
|C|
};
5 end
γ(C)√
|C|
. To that end, we propose Alg. 4 for obtaining such a cycle in a weighted dependency
graph. Line 3 of Alg. 4 searches for a cycle for maximizing cycle weight subject to the cycle
length being no more than i. Then, Line 4 of Alg. 4 can identify cycle C for maximizing γ(C)√
|C|
subject to the cycle length being no more than i; in particular, Line 4 can identify cycle C for
maximizing
γ(C)√
|C|
in the last iteration. The next lemma justifies the correctness of Alg. 4.
Lemma 12. Given a weighted dependency graph, Alg. 4 can identify a cycle C for maximizing
γ(C)√
|C|
.
Proof: See Appendix G.
The next theorem provides the approximation ratio of the modified approximation algorithm.
Theorem 13. Substituting Line 5 of Alg. 2 by identifying a cycle C for maximizing γ(C)√
|C|
yields
the approximation ratio of
√
n.
Proof: See Appendix H.
Because of Theorem 13, we refer to the coding scheme modified from Alg. 2 as
√
n-
approximate coding scheme. Moreover, similar to Theorem 11 along with Appendix F, we can
establish the truthfulness as follows.
Theorem 14. Substituting Line 5 of Alg. 2 and Lines 5 and 6 of Alg. 3 by identifying a cycle
C for maximizing γ(C)√
|C|
yields a truthful mechanism.
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D. Complexities of the proposed coding schemes
This section investigates the computational complexities of the three proposed coding schemes
for the multiple unicast scenario: 1) Alg. 1 for the instant decoding scheme; 2) max |C|-
approximate coding scheme (Alg. 2) for the general decoding scheme; 3)
√
n-approximate coding
scheme (modified Alg. 2 along with Alg. 4) for the general decoding scheme. All three schemes
are based on a weighted dependency graph. Constructing a weighted dependency graph takes
O(n2) steps to check all pairs of clients.
Regarding Alg. 1, we can apply the Edmond’s maximum weight matching algorithm [18] to
Line 4 of Alg. 1, whose complexity is O(n3). Then, the complexity of Alg. 1 is O(n3).
Regarding Alg. 2, we can apply the Floyd-Warshall algorithm [21] to Line 3 for each iteration,
whose complexity is O(n3). Because there are at most n/2 cycles in a weighted dependency
graph (i.e., at most n/2 iterations from Line 4), the complexity of max |C|-approximate coding
scheme is O(n4).
Regarding Alg. 4, we can apply the Bellman-Ford algorithm [21] to Line 3 for each iteration i,
whose complexity is O(i ·n2). Hence, the complexity of Alg. 4 is O(n4); in turn, the complexity
of the
√
n-approximate algorithm is O(n5).
E. Numerical results
This section numerically analyzes the proposed coding schemes for the multiple unicast
scenario via computer simulations, including Alg. 1, max |C|-approximate coding scheme in
Alg. 2, and
√
n-approximate coding scheme modified from Alg. 2.
Fig. 4 simulates Alg. 1 with the instant decoding scheme and the two approximate coding
schemes with the general decoding scheme. The two sub-figures display the social welfare when
each client has 3 and 6 data chunks, respectively, in its side information. The experiment setting
is following: We simulate n clients (x-axle), where client ci wants data chunk di. Value vi of
data chunk di is uniformly picked between 0 and 1. Let value vˆi = vi because of the truthfulness
guaranteed by the proposed payment schemes. The data chunks in side information Hi of client
ci is randomly selected from set D− {di}. All results are averaged over 500 simulation times.
From Fig. 4, we can observe that even though both approximate coding schemes cannot
achieve the maximum social welfare, they still outperform Alg. 1 (with the instant decoding
21
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Fig. 4. Social welfare of Alg. 1, max |C|-approximate coding scheme in Alg. 2, and √n-approximate coding scheme modified
from Alg. 2: (a) each client has 3 data chunks in its side information; (b) each client has 6 data chunks in its side information;
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Fig. 5. Benefit from the approximate coding schemes when each client has 3 data chunks in its side information.
scheme) for almost all cases. The result tells us that the proposed approximate coding schemes
can take advantage of the general decoding scheme.
To validate the proposed approximate coding schemes over uncoded schemes, Figs. 5 and 6
displays the total value
∑n
i=1 vi · 1i of the data chunks that can be recovered. The results for
the “no coding” scheme in Figs. 5 and 6 are obtained in the following way: we first obtain the
number η of transmissions incurred by an approximate coding scheme, and then calculate the
sum of the top η values of the data chunks in set D (which is the maximum total value when
the server transmits η uncoded data chunks). Note that the maximum social welfare is zero if
the server can transmit uncoded data chunks only. From Figs. 4 - 6, we can observe that both
approximate coding schemes improve both the social welfare and the total value over the best
uncoded scheme.
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Fig. 6. Benefit from the approximate coding schemes when each client has 6 data chunks in its side information.
VII. INAPPROXIMABILITY RESULTS FOR THE MULTIPLE MULTICAST SCENARIO
Thus far, we analyzed the multiple unicast scenario. This section analyzes the multiple mul-
ticast scenario. We start with the instant decoding scheme; in particular, we show that the
optimization problem in Eq. (4) is as hard to approximate as the independent set problem,
which is extremely hard to approximate [22].
Theorem 15. In the multiple multicast scenario with sparse coding schemes and the instant
decoding scheme, the combinatorial optimization problem in Eq. (4) is NP-hard and NP-hard
to approximate.
Proof: We construct a reduction from the independent set problem [22]. Given a graph
G(Λ,E) (with vertex set Λ and edge set E) of the independent set problem, we construct an
instance of our problem as follows. For each vertex λ ∈ Λ and edge e ∈ E, we construct data
chunks dλ and de. The data chunk set D consists of dλ and de for all λ ∈ Λ and e ∈ E. For
each edge e = (x, y) ∈ E, we construct three clients ce,1, ce,2, ce,3 such that
• we,1 = de, Hˆe,1 = {dx, dy}, vˆe,1 = 1,
• we,2 = dx, Hˆe,2 = {de}, vˆe,2 = 1deg(x) ,
• we,3 = dy, Hˆe,3 = {de}, vˆe,3 = 1deg(y) ,
where deg(λ) is the number of edges that are incident to vertex λ ∈ Λ. Then, Appendix I shows
that our problem equivalently becomes the independent set problem, yielding the result.
We have the same result for the general decoding scheme in the following theorem.
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Theorem 16. In the multiple multicast scenario with sparse coding schemes and the general
decoding scheme, the combinatorial optimization problem in Eq. (4) is NP-hard and NP-hard
to approximate.
Proof: See Appendix J.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper treated a practical index coding setting in the presence of selfish clients. We
proposed a sufficient condition for truthful mechanisms (i.e., joint coding and payment schemes).
Leveraging the proposed condition, we proposed computationally efficient mechanisms that are
truthful. The proposed mechanisms can either maximize the social welfare or approximate it
with provable approximation ratios. The simulation results also validate the proposed coding
schemes.
This paper proposed a new problem of joint coding and incentive design. Some interesting
future works are following. This paper focused on sparse coding schemes. The mechanism
design leveraging more advanced coding schemes would be interesting. Moreover, approximate
or exact mechanism design for the multiple multicast scenario is still undiscovered. Finally, this
paper includes money transfers as an incentive. Developing a non-momentary truthful mechanism
would be promising.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
First, we claim that if the first and second conditions hold, then for any value set Vˆ−i and
any side information set Hˆ, client ci can maximize its utility by submitting the true value vi of
data chunk wi. To prove that claim, we consider three cases as follows.
1) vi > v¯i(Vˆ−i, Hˆ): First, suppose that client ci submits the true value vi of data chunk wi.
By the first condition, client ci can recover data chunk wi. By the second condition, client
ci is charged threshold v¯i(Vˆ−i, Hˆ). Thus, client ci has utility vi− v¯i(Vˆ−i, Hˆ) > 0. Second,
suppose that client ci submits value vˆi 6= vi of data chunk wi. By the first and second
conditions, if 1i = 1, then client ci has utility vi− v¯i(Vˆ−i, Hˆ); if 1i = 0, then client ci has
zero utility. In summary, client ci can maximize its utility by submitting the true value vi
of data chunk wi.
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2) vi < v¯i(Vˆ−i, Hˆ): First, suppose that client ci submits the true value vi of data chunk wi.
By the first and second conditions, client ci has zero utility. Second, suppose that client
ci submits value vˆi 6= vi of data chunk wi. By the first and second condition, if 1i = 1,
then client ci has utility vi − v¯i(Vˆ−i, Hˆ) < 0; if 1i = 0, then client ci has zero utility. In
summary, client ci can maximize its utility by submitting the true value vi of data chunk
wi.
3) vi = v¯i(Vˆ−i, Hˆ): First, suppose that client ci submits the true value vi of data chunk wi.
By the second condition, client ci has zero utility whether it can recover data chunk wi
or not. Second, suppose that client ci submits value vˆi 6= vi of data chunk wi. If 1i = 1,
then client ci has utility vi − v¯i(Vˆ−i, Hˆ) = 0; if 1i = 0, then client ci has zero utility. In
summary, client ci can maximize its utility by submitting the true value vi of data chunk
wi.
Second, according to the above claim, we can suppose that all clients submit the true values
of the data chunks they want. Thus, it remains to show that, for any side information set Hˆ−i,
client ci can maximize its utility by submitting its complete side information Hi. To prove that
claim, we consider three cases as follows.
1) vi > v¯i(V−i, {Hi, Hˆ−i}): First, suppose that client ci submits the complete side information
Hi. By the first and second conditions, client ci has utility vi − v¯i(V−i, {Hi, Hˆ−i}) > 0.
Second, suppose that client ci submits incomplete side information Hˆi ⊂ Hi. If 1i = 1,
then client ci has utility vi− v¯i(V−i, Hˆ) ≤ vi− v¯i(V−i, {Hi, Hˆ−i}) by the third condition;
if 1i = 0, then client ci has zero utility. In summary, client ci can maximize its utility by
submitting the complete side information Hi.
2) vi < v¯i(V−i, {Hi, Hˆ−i}): First, suppose that client ci submits the complete side information
Hi. By the first and second conditions, client ci has zero utility. Second, suppose that
client ci submits incomplete side information Hˆi ⊂ Hi. By the third condition, we have
v¯i(V−i, Hˆ) ≥ v¯i(V−i, {Hi, Hˆ−i}) > vi. By the first and second conditions, client ci has
zero utility. In summary, client ci can maximize its utility by submitting the complete side
information Hi.
3) vi = v¯i(V−i, {Hi, Hˆ−i}): First, suppose that client ci submits the complete side information
Hi. By the second condition, client ci has zero utility whether it can recover data chunk
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wi or not. Second, suppose that client ci submits incomplete side information Hˆi ⊂ Hi.
If 1i = 1, then client ci has utility vi − v¯i(V−i, Hˆ) ≤ vi − v¯i(V−i, {Hi, Hˆ−i}) = 0 by
the third condition; if 1i = 0, then client ci has zero utility. In summary, client ci can
maximize its utility by submitting the complete side information Hi.
Then, we complete the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Let Gˆi be the sets of coding matrices that can recover data chunk wi with side information Hˆi.
Moreover, let Gci is the set of coding matrices with coding vector Gi = (0, · · · , 0) (that cannot
recover data chunk wi). Note that, according to Eq. (4) and Remark 3, the VCG-coding scheme
identifies a coding matrix G∗ for maximizing function w(Vˆ, Hˆ, G) among those coding matrices
in set Gˆi ∪Gci . Then, we show that the VCG-based mechanism satisfies the three conditions in
Theorem 2 as follows.
1) The VCG-based coding scheme is a threshold-type coding scheme: Consider a fixed value
set Vˆ−i and a fixed side information set Hˆ. First, suppose that while client ci submits a
value vˆi of data chunk wi, it can recover data chunk wi by coding matrix G
∗ (maximizing
function w(Vˆ, Hˆ, G) for all G ∈ Gˆi ∪Gci ). Second, suppose that client ci submits a value
v˜i > vˆi of data chunk wi. Let value set {v˜i, Vˆ−i} be value set Vˆ with vˆi being substituted
by v˜i. Because the number η of transmissions in Eq. (3) is independent of the value sets
for a coding matrix G, we can express function w({v˜i, Vˆ−i}, Hˆ, G) by
w({v˜i, Vˆ−i}, Hˆ, G) =

 w(Vˆ, Hˆ, G) + (v˜i − vˆi) if G ∈ Gˆi;w(Vˆ, Hˆ, G) if G ∈ Gci , (10)
Then, we can obtain
w({v˜i, Vˆ−i}, Hˆ, G∗) (a)=w(Vˆ, Hˆ, G∗) + (v˜i − vˆi)
(b)
≥w(Vˆ, Hˆ, G) + (v˜i − vˆi) for all G ∈ Gci
(c)
>w({v˜i, Vˆ−i}, Hˆ, G) for all G ∈ Gci ,
where (a) is from Eq. (10) along with G∗ ∈ Gˆi; (b) is because coding matrix G∗ maximizes
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function w(Vˆ, Hˆ, G); (c) is from Eq. (10) and v˜i > vˆi. Thus, while client ci submits value
v˜i (> vˆi) of data chunk wi, it can recover data chunk wi by the VCG-based coding
scheme. Then, we can conclude that the VCG-based coding scheme is a threshold-type
coding scheme.
2) The VCG-based payment scheme determines payment pi = v¯i(Vˆ−i, Hˆ) if client ci can
recover data chunk wi: Consider a fixed value set Vˆ−i and a fixed side information set
Hˆ. We claim that threshold v¯i(Vˆ−i, Hˆ) of the VCG-based coding scheme is
v¯i(Vˆ−i, Hˆ) = max
G∈Gci
w({0, Vˆi}, Hˆ, G)− max
G∈Gˆi
w({0, Vˆi}, Hˆ, G). (11)
Then, the first term of Eq. (5)
max
G∈Gˆi∪Gci
w({0, Vˆi}, Hˆ, G) = max
G∈Gci
w({0, Vˆi}, Hˆ, G)
is the first term of Eq. (11) because of vˆi = 0. Moreover, the second term of Eq. (5)
w({0, Vˆi}, Hˆ, G∗) (a)=w(Vˆ, Hˆ, G∗)− vˆi
(b)
= max
G∈Gˆi
w(Vˆ, Hˆ, G)− vˆi
(c)
= max
G∈Gˆi
w({0, Vˆi}, Hˆ, G)
is the second term of Eq. (11), where (a) is from Eq. (10) along with G∗ ∈ Gˆi (Eq. (5)
assumes 1ˆi = 1); (b) is because G
∗ maximizes function w(Vˆ, Hˆ, G∗) along with G∗ ∈ Gˆi;
(c) is from Eq. (10). Then, we complete the proof if the claim is true.
To establish that claim, we first consider the case when client ci submits value vˆi >
maxG∈Gci w({0, Vˆi}, Hˆ, G)−maxG∈Gˆi w({0, Vˆi}, Hˆ, G) of data chunk wi. Then, we can
obtain
max
G∈Gˆi
w(Vˆ, Hˆ, G)
(a)
= max
G∈Gˆi
w({0, Vˆ−i}, Hˆ, G) + vˆi
(b)
> max
G∈Gci
w({0, Vˆ−i}, Hˆ, G)
(c)
= max
G∈Gˆci
w(Vˆ, Hˆ, G),
where (a) and (c) are from Eq. (10); (b) is by the assumption of vˆi. Thus, while client
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ci submits value vˆi (> maxG∈Gci w({0, Vˆi}, Hˆ, G) − maxG∈Gˆi w({0, Vˆi}, Hˆ, G)) of data
chunk wi, it can recover data chunk wi by the VCG-based coding scheme. Second, similar
to the above argument, while client ci submits value vˆi < maxG∈Gci w({0, Vˆi}, Hˆ, G) −
maxG∈Gˆi w({0, Vˆi}, Hˆ, G) of data chunk wi, it cannot recover data chunk wi by the VCG-
based coding scheme. Fully considering both cases establishes Eq. (11).
3) v¯i(V−i, {Hi, Hˆ−i}) ≤ v¯i(V−i, Hˆ) under the VCG-based coding scheme for all Hˆ: Consider
a fixed side information set Hˆ−i. Let Gi be the sets of coding matrices that can recover
data chunk wi with side information Hi. Since Hˆi ⊆ Hi, we have Gˆi ⊆ Gi. Then, we can
obtain
v¯i(V−i, {Hi, Hˆ−i}) (a)= max
G∈Gci
w({0,Vi}, {Hi, Hˆ−i}, G)− max
G∈Gi
w({0,Vi}, {Hi, Hˆ−i}, G)
(b)
= max
G∈Gci
w({0,Vi}, Hˆ, G)− max
G∈Gi
w({0,Vi}, Hˆ, G)
(c)
≤ max
G∈Gci
w({0,Vi}, Hˆ, G)− max
G∈Gˆi
w({0,Vi}, Hˆ, G) (d)= v¯i(V−i, Hˆ−i),
where (a) and (d) are from Eq. (11); (b) is because vˆi = 0; (c) is because Gˆi ⊆ Gi. We
complete the proof.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
We construct a reduction from the original index coding problem, whose objective is to identify
a coding matrix for minimizing the number of transmissions. Given an instance of the original
index coding problem, we construct the same instance for our problem and set vˆi = 1 for all
i. In this context, all clients can recover the data chunks they want by the VCG-based coding
scheme, yielding w(Vˆ, Hˆ, G) = n−η. Because of the constant n, the combinatorial optimization
problem in Eq. (4) becomes the index coding problem. Then, the NP-hardness of the index coding
problem causes the NP-hardness of our problem.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 8
We construct a reduction from the cycle packing problem [19], whose objective is to identify
the maximum number of disjoint cycles in a directed graph. Given a directed graph G(Λ,A)
28
(with vertex set Λ and arc set A) of the cycle packing problem, we construct the weighted
dependency graph G(Λ,A,Γ) with arc weight γa = 1 for all a ∈ A. The weighted dependency
graph implies that all clients ci submits values vˆi = 1 and thus can recover the data chunks
they want by the VCG-based coding scheme. Thus, we can express function w(Vˆ, Hˆ, G) in
Eq. (6) by w(Vˆ, Hˆ, G) = n− (n− |C|) for coding matrix G encoding along a set C of disjoint
cycles, where the first term n is the total value of those data chunks that can be recovered and
the second term (n − |C|) is the total number of transmissions (because each cycle can save
one transmission). Then, the combinatorial optimization problem in Eq. (4) becomes the cycle
packing problem. The NP-hardness of the cycle packing problem causes the NP-hardness of our
problem.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 9
Let C∗ be a set of those disjoint cycles that maximizes the total cycle weight in weighted
dependency graph G(Λ,A,Γ). Let graph G(Λk,Ak,Γk) be the remaining graph at the beginning
of iteration k. Let Ck be a cycle minimizing the cycle cost in graph G(Λk,Ak,Γk). Let C∗k be
the set of those cycles that appear in set C∗ and also in graph G(Λk,Ak,Γk). By Ck ∩C∗k we
denote the set of those cycles in C∗k that has a common vertex with cycle Ck.
We define APXk = γ(Ck) and OPTk =
∑
C∈(Ck∩C
∗
k
) γ(C). Because cycle Ck maximizes the
cycle weight in iteration k, any cycle C ∈ Ck ∩C∗k has cycle weight γ(C) less than or equal to
APXk. Moreover, since there are |Ck| vertices in cycle Ck, there are at most |Ck| cycles in set
Ck ∩C∗k (because those cycles are disjoint). Thus, we can obtain OPTk ≤ |Ck| · APXk. Then,
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we can complete the proof (by Eq. (7)) as follow:
w(Vˆ, Hˆ, G∗) =w([Vˆ]+1 , Hˆ, G
∗) +
∑
vˆi≥1
(vˆi − 1)
≤
∑
k
OPTk +
∑
vˆi≥1
(vˆi − 1)
≤
∑
k
|Ck|APXk +
∑
vˆi≥1
(vˆi − 1)
≤max
k
|Ck|
(∑
k
APXk +
∑
vˆi≥1
(vˆi − 1)
)
=max
k
|Ck|
(
w([Vˆ]+1 , Hˆ, Galg 2) +
∑
vˆi≥1
(vˆi − 1)
)
=max
k
|Ck| · w(Vˆ, Hˆ, Galg 2),
where [Vˆ]+1 = ([vˆ1]
+
1 , · · · , [vˆn]+1 ).
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THEOREM 11
We show that the mechanism consisting of the coding scheme in Alg. 2 and the payment
scheme in Alg. 3 satisfies the three conditions in Theorem 2 as follows.
• Alg. 2 is a threshold-type coding scheme: First, suppose that while client ci submits a value
vˆi of data chunk wi, it can recover data chunk wi. Then, Alg. 2 transmits along a cycle
C containing vertex λi in some iteration k. Second, suppose that client ci submits a value
v˜i > vˆi. If Alg. 2 encodes along a cycle containing vertex λi before iteration k, then we
complete the proof; otherwise, if Alg. 2 cannot, then the cycle C also maximizes cycle
weight γ(C) in iteration k (following Appendix B). That is, while client ci submits value
v˜i (> vˆi), it can recover data chunk wi by Alg. 2. Then, we complete the proof.
• Alg. 3 determines payment pi = v¯i(Vˆ−i, Hˆ) if client ci can recover data chunk wi: Following
Appendix B, we can establish that ζ(C2) − ζ(C1) in Line 7 of Alg. 3 (for an iteration)
calculates the minimum value vˆi submitted by client ci such that Alg. 2 transmits along a
cycle containing vertex λi (for that iteration). In particular, in the last iteration, Line 7 of
Alg. 3 produces the minimum value vˆi such that Alg. 2 can recover data chunk wi. Then,
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we complete the proof.
• v¯i(V−i, {Hi, Hˆ−i}) ≤ v¯i(V−i, Hˆ) under Alg. 2 for all Hˆ: Following Appendix B, we can
establish that the value of ζ(C2)− ζ(C1) for side information set {Hi, Hˆ−i} is less than or
equal to that for side information set Hˆ (for each iteration), yielding the result.
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF LEMMA 12
We prove the lemma by induction on iteration i. When iteration i = 2, Alg. 4 obviously can
produce cycle C for maximizing γ(C)√
|C|
for |C| ≤ 2. Next, suppose that when iteration i = k,
Alg. 4 produces cycle Ck for maximizing
γ(C)√
|C|
for |C| ≤ k. Suppose that when iteration i = k+1,
Line 3 of Alg. 4 produces cycle Ck+1 maximizing γ(C) for |C| ≤ k+1. Note that Ck maximizes
γ(C)√
|C|
for |C| ≤ k; moreover, if |Ck+1| = k, then cycle Ck+1 maximizes γ(C)√
|C|
for |C| = k + 1.
Thus, either cycle Ck or cycle Ck+1 maximizes
γ(C)√
|C|
for |C| ≤ k+1. Thus, Line 4 can produce
a cycle C for maximizing γ(C)√
|C|
for |C| ≤ k + 1. Then, we complete the proof.
APPENDIX H
PROOF OF THEOREM 13
Follow the notation set in Appendix E; however, re-define Ck as a cycle maximizing
γ(C)√
|C|
in
graph G(Λk,Ak,Γk), i.e., γ(Ck)√
|Ck|
≥ γ(C)√
|C|
for all cycles C in graph G(Λk,Ak,Γk). Then, we can
bound OPTk above by
OPTk =
∑
C∈Ck∩C
∗
k
γ(C)
≤ γ(Ck)√|Ck|
∑
C∈Ck∩C
∗
k
√
|C|
(a)
≤ APTk√|Ck|
√
|Ck ∩C∗k|
√ ∑
C∈Ck∩C
∗
k
|C|
(b)
≤ APTk√|Ck|
√
|Ck|
√
n
=
√
n · APTk,
where (a) is from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality; (b) is because all cycles C ∈ Ck ∩ C∗k are
disjoint. Hence, OPTk ≤
√
n · APXk, yielding the approximation ratio of
√
n.
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APPENDIX I
PROOF OF THEOREM 15
The proof needs the following three technical lemmas.
Lemma 17. For the instance of our problem constructed from graph G(Λ,E) of the independent
set problem, coding matrix G∗ from Eq. (4) can satisfy all clients.
Proof: First, coding matrix G∗ can satisfy client ce,1 for all e ∈ E, because they submit
values vˆe,1 = 1. Second, suppose that coding matrix G
∗ cannot satisfy client ce,2 for some
e = (x, y) ∈ E. Let Sx = {ce′,2 : e′ ∈ E−{e} and is incident to vertex x} be the set of clients
(except for client ce,2) whose associated edges are incident to vertex u. We consider two cases
as follows.
1) Coding matrix G∗ can satisfy a client ce′,2 in set Su: Because coding matrix G
∗ cannot
satisfy client ce,2, coding matrix G
∗ includes the coding vector of dx+de′ (for client ce′,2 to
recover data chunk dx but for client ce,2 not to recover data chunk dx). Then, substituting
the coding vector of dx + de′ in coding matrix G
∗ by that of dx can increase the function
value w(Vˆ, Hˆ, G∗) by at least 1
deg(x)
, because the value of recovered data chunks increase
by vˆe,2. That contradicts to the optimality of coding matrix G
∗. Thus, coding matrix G∗
satisfies client ce,2.
2) Coding matrix G∗ cannot satisfy all clients in set Sx: Adding the coding vector of dx to
coding matrix G∗ does not change the function value w(Vˆ, Hˆ, G∗), because the value of
recovered data chunks increases by one and the transmission cost also increases by one.
Then, coding matrix G∗ from Eq. (4) can satisfy client ce,2
Then, we complete the proof.
Lemma 18. For the instance of our problem constructed from graph G(Λ,E) of the independent
set problem, we have η∗ ≤ |E|+ OPTvc, where η∗ is the minimum number of transmissions to
satisfy all clients, and OPTvc is the minimum size of those vertex covers in graph G(Λ,E).
Proof: Let Λ∗ ⊆ Λ be a minimum vertex cover in graph G(Λ,E). We construct a coding
matrix G as follows.
• For each vertex λ ∈ Λ∗, add the coding vector of dλ to coding matrix G;
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• For each edge e = (x, y) ∈ E, if both x ∈ Λ∗ and y ∈ Λ∗, add the coding vector of de to
coding matrix G; if either x /∈ Λ∗ or y /∈ Λ∗, add the coding vector of dx + de or dy + de,
respectively, to coding matrix G.
Note that the total number of transmissions made by the constructed coding matrix G is OPTvc+
|E|. Moreover, by the following four cases,
• client ce,1 can recover the data chuck it wants with de, dx + de, or dy + de;
• for edge e = (x, y) ∈ E, if x ∈ Λ∗ and y ∈ Λ∗, then clients ce,2 and ce,3 can recover the
data chucks they want with dx and dy, respectively;
• for each e = (x, y) ∈ E, if x /∈ Λ∗ and y ∈ Λ∗, then client ce,2 can recover the data chuck
it wants with dx + de and also client ce,3 can with dy,
• for each e = (x, y) ∈ E, if x ∈ Λ∗ and y /∈ Λ∗, then client ce,2 can recover the data chuck
it wants with dx and also client ce,3 can with dy + de,
the constructed coding matrix G can satisfy all clients, yielding η∗ ≤ |E|+OPTvc.
Lemma 19. For the instance of our problem constructed from graph G(Λ,E) of the independent
set problem, we have η∗ ≥ |E|+OPTvc.
Proof: First, for satisfying client ce,1 (associated with edge e = (x, y)) with the instant
decoding scheme, the server has to make at least one transmission (denoted by te) of de, de+dx,
or de + dy. Thus, the server has to make at least |E| transmissions for satisfying client ce,1 for
all e ∈ E.
Second, let Λ˜ ⊆ Λ be the set of vertices x that have an incident edge e = (x, y) so that client
ce,2 cannot recover the data chunk it wants with transmission te. For satisfying that client ce,2,
the server has to transmit at least one of dx or dx + de. Thus, the server has to make at least
another |Λ˜| transmissions for satisfying all clients in set Λ˜.
For satisfying all clients, the server has to make at least |E|+ |Λ˜| transmissions. Note that, for
each edge e ∈ E, at most one of clients ce,2 or ce,3 can recover the data chucks they want with te.
In particular, for each edge in set E, one of its incident vertices belongs to set Λ˜. Thus, set Λ˜ is a
vertex cover, yielding |Λ˜| ≥ OPTvc. To conclude, we can obtain η∗ ≥ |E|+ |Λ˜| ≥ |E|+OPTvc.
Then, we are ready to prove Theorem 15. Because coding matrix G∗ can satisfy all clients
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(from Lemma 17), we can express the function value w(Vˆ, Hˆ, G∗) in Eq. (3) by
w(Vˆ, Hˆ, G∗) =
∑
e∈E
vˆe,1 +
∑
e∈E
(vˆe,2 + vˆe,3)− η = |E|+ |Λ| − η (a)= |E|+ |Λ| − η∗,
where (a) is because coding matrix G∗ (for maximizing w(Vˆ, Hˆ, G∗)) minimizes the number
of transmissions. Moreover, because of η∗ = |E| + OPTvc (from Lemmas 18 and 19), we can
obtain w(Vˆ, Hˆ, G∗) = |Λ|−OPTvc. Let OPTis be the maximum size of those independent sets
in graph G(Λ,E). Because of OPTis+OPTvc = |Λ|, we finally obtain w(Vˆ, Hˆ, G∗) = OPTis.
Then, the theorem follows from the hardness of the independent set problem [22].
APPENDIX J
PROOF OF THEOREM 16
The proof follows Appendix I, with some modifications to Lemma 19 as below. First, for
satisfying client ce,1, the server has to transmit te = de + d for some d ∈ D∪ ∅. Note that if the
server transmits te and te′ with te = te′ = de + de′ for some e, e
′ ∈ E, then the server needs to
make another transmission for satisfying clients ce,1 and ce′,1, because both clients do not have
data chunks de′ and de, respectively, in their side information. Therefore, for satisfying client
ce,1 for all e ∈ E, the server needs to make at least |E| transmissions. Without loss of generality,
we can assume that data chunk te is different for all e ∈ E.
Second, use the same definition of set Λ˜ as that in Appendix I. For satisfying a client associated
with λ ∈ Λ˜ (that wants data dλ), the server has to make at least one transmission denoted by
tλ = dλ + d for some d ∈ D∪ ∅. If the server transmits tλ = tλ′ = dλ + dλ′ for some λ, λ′ ∈ Λ˜,
then the server needs to make another transmission because both clients (associated with λ and
λ′) do not have dλ′ and dλ, respectively, in their side information. Thus, the server has to make
at least another |Λ˜| transmissions for satisfying all clients in set Λ˜.
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